In May 2025, Tunisia enacted Law No. 9-2025, a landmark reform that fundamentally redefines the legal foundations of employment relationships. The law introduces an ambitious overhaul of the Labor Code, based on three pillars: indefinite employment contracts (CDI) as the default arrangement; the prohibition of unlawful labor outsourcing; and the retroactive conversion of fixed-term contracts into permanent employment agreements.
The indefinite employment contract (CDI) as the norm
At the heart of the reform lies the principle of contractual permanence. The new legal regime establishes a presumption in favor of the CDI, making it the standard employment model under Article 6. Employment contracts are now presumed to be indefinite in duration unless the employer can clearly demonstrate that the relationship satisfies one of a limited set of statutory exceptions. The use of fixed-term contracts has thus become exceptional and is now restricted to three narrowly defined cases: replacing an absent worker, addressing a temporary increase in workload, or performing work that is seasonal or of an inherently exceptional nature. This change resolves prior legal uncertainties and places the burden of proof on the employer, reflecting a shift towards a legal framework that offers greater protection for employees. The reform further reinforces this limitation by imposing administrative fines for non-compliance, ranging from 100 to 300 Tunisian dinars (approximately €30 to €90) per worker, capped at 10,000 TND (around €3,000) per employer.
Probation Periods
The reform also codifies stricter rules governing probationary periods. Trial periods are now limited to a maximum of six months, renewable only once, and are rendered non-repeatable if the worker is rehired. The principle of non-répétition de la période d’essai now governs reappointments following a failed probationary period. Should an employer wish to rehire the same worker, it must be done through a CDI without the benefit of a new probationary period. This provision restricts employer discretion and codifies judicial interpretations that have long condemned successive trial periods as incompatible with the principle of bonne foi contractuelle.
Conversion of Existing Contracts and Employer Liabilities
A particularly consequential and novel aspect of the reform is its retroactive requalification mechanism. Article 17 introduces an effet automatique de requalification, whereby any CDD in force at the time the law entered into effect—or any CDD terminated after 14 March 2025—is deemed to be a CDI by operation of law. This transformation has constitutive legal effects, preserving the employee’s accrued seniority and requiring no further contractual formality. The reform goes even further by requiring the reinstatement, as permanent employees, of workers who have accumulated at least four years of fixed-term service and whose contracts were terminated after 6 March 2024. This provision introduces a statutory reinstatement mechanism enforceable before Tunisia’s labor courts. Employers were granted a three-month grace period to comply, after which they are liable for an indemnity equal to two months of salary per year of prior service. For example, a worker earning 1,200 TND (approx. €360) per month with five years of service could claim compensation amounting to 12,000 TND (approx. €3,600). The indemnity serves both a compensatory and punitive function, reinforcing the law’s status as ordre public social.
Prohibition of Employment Service Providers
A second major pillar of the reform concerns subcontracting arrangements. Article 28 introduces an explicit ban on labor-only subcontracting (mounaoula or prêt de main-d’œuvre), broadly defined as any arrangement in which an entity supplies personnel to another for remuneration, with the employees placed under the authority of the beneficiary company. This practice, now expressly prohibited, is subject to heavy administrative penalties—10,000 TND (approx. €3,000) for individuals and 20,000 TND (approx. €6,000) for corporate entities—with criminal sanctions, including imprisonment of three to six months, applicable in the case of repeat offenses. The legal rationale underlying this ban lies in the intuitu personae nature of employment contracts and the principle that labor cannot be commercialized or transferred as a commodity.
Despite the categorical nature of the ban, the law preserves space for legitimate service contracts. Article 30 permits outsourcing when three cumulative conditions are met: the service must involve specialized or technical expertise; it must relate to a function that is ancillary to the client’s core business; and the service provider must retain hierarchical and disciplinary authority over its staff. These conditions are clearly inspired by international labor standards and comparative jurisprudence—most notably French case law—which distinguish lawful service provision from prohibited labor leasing. Even where lawful outsourcing exists, the reform imposes significant legal obligations. The provider must post a financial guarantee to cover wages and social security contributions, and the beneficiary company becomes jointly and severally liable for compliance with labor laws. Moreover, in cases where the service provider lacks a sector-specific collective agreement, the more favorable terms from the beneficiary’s sector are extended to the provider’s employees. This principe de faveur par extension is designed to prevent forms of indirect wage dumping and to maintain equity across similarly situated workers.
Perhaps the most far-reaching provision in terms of practical consequences is the automatic integration mechanism. Workers previously engaged through prohibited subcontracting arrangements must now be directly absorbed by the user company, with full recognition of seniority and the imposition of standard employment rights. This effectively constitutes a legal novation (novation légale) and a transfer of legal obligations by operation of law. The reform thus seeks to dismantle intermediary employment structures that were previously used to circumvent legal obligations and to reestablish the direct employer-employee relationship as the central axis of labor regulation.
The reform’s potential interaction with international commercial contracts—especially those involving cross-border service provision—raises complex questions of extraterritoriality, choice of law, and jurisdiction. In scenarios where Tunisian labor is supplied by or to foreign entities under international service agreements, future litigation may test the boundaries of domestic public policy (ordre public) against party autonomy clauses, particularly in disputes involving foreign arbitration or the application of foreign law.
Enhancing Protectionism?
Overall, the 2025 reform introduces a “highly protective” and interventionist regime, fundamentally restructuring the legal landscape of employment relationships in Tunisia. It codifies and unifies doctrines that courts had previously applied inconsistently, closes loopholes that allowed for structural precariousness, and affirms the state’s constitutional commitment to social justice in labor matters. Yet, the breadth of the reform also introduces potential legal uncertainty—especially for sectors that depend on external service providers—and risks unintended effects if implementation is not accompanied by clear regulatory guidance. Companies operating in Tunisia may need to revisit existing service arrangements, update compliance protocols, and reassess their workforce structures in light of these changes.
In the short term, the success of the reform will depend on the issuance of implementing regulations (décrets d’application) by the Ministry of Social Affairs, including interpretive guidelines distinguishing legitimate service provision from illicit labor leasing. A typology of compliant service models, model CDI templates, and sector-specific FAQs would help ensure uniform compliance and reduce litigation. Additionally, the Ministry may consider publishing a whitelist of sectors presumed to fall outside the subcontracting ban (e.g., IT, outsourced logistics, maintenance, or private security, when structured appropriately), while allowing for case-by-case administrative review. Ultimately, the effectiveness of Law No. 9-2025 will also hinge on its practical enforceability, the jurisprudential interpretations adopted by Tunisian courts, and the capacity of labor inspection authorities to identify and sanction circumvention. Proactive legal review and strategic HR planning will be critical to mitigate potential risks and ensure compliance moving forward.
If you would like more information about this topic then please contact us.
-
SENIOR ASSOCIATE
BERLIN | AMERELLER Rechtsanwälte | Kurfuerstenhöfe, Spreeufer 5, 10178 | Berlin, Germany | T: +49 30 609 895 660
This client alert is a public document for informational purposes only and should not be construed as legal advice. Readers should not act upon the information provided here without consulting with professional legal counsel. This material may be considered advertising under certain rules of professional conduct. Copyright © 2025
