On 19 December 2025, various international and Moroccan media reported that the Swedish telecommunications company Ericsson had brought a patent infringement lawsuit before the Commercial Court of First Instance in Casablanca against the Chinese company Transsion, which (through brands such as Tecno, iTel, and Infinix) is the leading vendor of smartphones in Morocco.[1] This lawsuit is part of an escalating global dispute between Ericsson and Transsion regarding the licensing of patents that are essential to 4G and 5G mobile telecommunication standards. While litigation over the terms of worldwide licenses to global portfolios of standard-essential patents (SEPs) has long been relatively common in countries such as China, Germany, the United Kingdom, and the United States, this is the first reported SEP litigation in Morocco. This article provides an initial analysis of this recent development. It aims to introduce a Moroccan audience to some relevant background information about global SEP licensing disputes, as well as to review some key features of patent litigation in Morocco for an international audience.
Statement of the Facts of the Ericsson v. Transsion Disputes
On 14 November 2025, Ericsson sued Transsion in Brazil, India, Nigeria, and the Unified Patent Court (UPC) in Europe after years of unsuccessful licensing negotiations.[2] Ericsson describes Transsion as its last remaining unlicensed top ten smartphone supplier and alleges that Transsion has continued to use Ericsson’s 4G/5G standard-essential technology while rejecting Ericsson’s licensing offers during eight years of SEP licensing negotiations.
In December 2025, Ericsson expanded its litigation campaign, adding new lawsuits in Indonesia, Colombia, and Morocco.[3] These additional lawsuits further underscore Ericsson’s willingness to litigate in jurisdictions with limited prior SEP track records, particularly when the implementer’s local sales footprint may create negotiation leverage. Ericsson’s Chief Patent Enforcement Officer, Robert Earle, framed the second wave as a response to Transsion’s refusal to accept Ericsson’s offer to resolve the companies’ differences through arbitration.[4]
The Ericsson v. Transsion dispute also sits within a broader enforcement trend around Transsion. In 2024 and 2025, major licensors, namely Qualcomm and Philips, brought patent infringement actions against Transsion, which were later settled and/or resulted in licensing agreements.[5]
Transsion’s rising litigation exposure reflects its growing commercial significance, particularly in Africa. Under its subsidiary brands TECNO, iTel, and Infinix, Transsion has built a distribution and after-sales footprint that translated into outsized African market shares. According to Canalys data, Transsion’s shipment share in the African smartphone market reached 51% in 2024, with an annual growth rate of 10%.[6] This scale matters for SEP enforcement because even a single national decision can significantly impact supply and settlement dynamics when a vendor relies on uninterrupted sales in high-volume, price-sensitive markets.
Transsion also holds increasing market share outside Africa, which helps explain Ericsson’s multi-continent venue mix. According to Canalys’ report on the 2024 global handset rebound, Transsion is the fourth-largest smartphone manufacturer, with a 15% increase to 106.7 million devices and growing prominence in emerging markets.[7] Ericsson’s enforcement actions consequently focused on countries in which Transsion holds significant market shares – Nigeria (where Transsion’s smartphone market share is reported at ~63%) and Morocco (reported at >50% share) – while also adding growth markets such as Indonesia (reported at ~21% share) and Colombia.[8]
Background on SEP Disputes
SEPs are patents that are essential to a technology standard, such as the 4G and 5G standards defined by 3GPP. 3GPP is a consortium of seven standards development organizations (SDOs) and is the leading global forum for developing mobile telecommunication standards.
A patent is considered essential to a standard if it is not possible to implement a technology standard without using the patented technology. For some standards, and in particular cellular telecommunication technology standards such as 4G and 5G, there are tens of thousands of patents declared to be standard-essential, and these patents are owned by hundreds of different companies. [9] This situation leads to a tension between the goal of SDOs to develop standards that are open to all and widely used, and the exclusive rights of patent holders to their inventions. This tension is resolved by patent holders’ commitments to make licenses available on terms that are fair, reasonable, and non-discriminatory (FRAND).
In practice, there are several challenges to FRAND licensing of SEPs.[10] SDOs such as 3GPP do not verify which patents are essential to their standards. This can often lead to disputes between standards implementers and companies that declare ownership of SEPs; and ultimately, only a court can determine whether a patent is essential and infringed by a product that implements a standard. Similarly, implementers often take the position that patents are invalid (for example, lack novelty with respect to other companies’ contributions to a standard), and disputes regarding patent validity relatively often end up in court.[11]
Furthermore, SEP owners and implementers often disagree on what constitutes FRAND licensing terms. On one hand, implementers sometimes accuse SEP holders of not living up to their commitment to make licenses available on FRAND terms but instead seeking exorbitant royalty rates that unduly leverage the market power created by standardization (a behavior that is referred to as “hold-up”). On the other hand, SEP holders allege that certain implementers are unwilling to accept FRAND licensing offers or to seriously engage in negotiations to reach a reasonable agreement and instead use delaying tactics to avoid paying any royalties (a behavior referred to as “hold-out”).
Global Disputes in National Courts
Resolution of these disputes is complicated by the fact that, while licensing disputes are global in scope, patents are national in scope. Therefore, SEP holders and implementers must turn to national courts to seek resolution of their global disputes.
Historically, most SEP litigation has taken place in courts in the U.S. and Europe (and here, more specifically, in Germany and the UK). Over the last two decades, an increasing share of disputes have also been litigated in Asia, with Chinese courts now accounting for a large share of global SEP litigation.[12] More recently, however, there has been an increasing diversification of SEP litigation venues; with an increasing number of SEP litigation taking place in a growing number of developing countries such as India, Brazil, Colombia, Indonesia, or Nigeria.
Different factors are driving this dynamic. Certainly, the growing economic weight of developing countries plays an important role. In addition, differences between the approaches of courts in different jurisdictions encourage the parties of SEP licensing negotiations to experiment with different venues.
Worldwide, two different approaches have emerged. On one hand, courts in the U.S., and – more recently – China and the UK have emerged as venues of choice for parties seeking a court determination of worldwide FRAND licensing terms.[13] Courts in each of these countries have declared themselves competent to interpret the contractual FRAND licensing obligations arising out of the patent policies of private SDOs.[14] Such proceedings have the potential to result in a comprehensive resolution of a global dispute. However, they are also complex, time-consuming, and expensive. On the other hand, courts in other countries – and in particular in Germany, as well as the recently created Unified Patent Court in the EU – regularly award injunctions against standard implementers deemed unwilling to accept SEP holders’ FRAND licensing offers.[15] While the immediate effect of such an injunction is to prohibit the continued sale of infringing products within the national territory of the court that issued the injunction, the award of an injunction in one country often results in a global licensing agreement. A prominent example is the case of Daimler, which entered into a comprehensive licensing agreement to license cellular communication technology SEPs from a pool including the patents of 49[16] different patent owners after a German court awarded Nokia an injunction against Daimler.
Nevertheless, there are limits to the power of an individual court’s injunction. In one case, Oppo preferred to withdraw its products from the German market, rather than accepting Nokia’s SEP licensing offer [17]. This case illustrates that an injunction in one national market may not be sufficient to incentivize a global agreement (especially in the case of a company like Transsion, which primarily sells its products in emerging markets). Furthermore, courts in the EU do not automatically grant injunctions when a patent is found to be standard-essential. Following a procedure defined by the Court of Justice of the European Union in its Huawei v ZTE decision, courts first determine whether a SEP holder’s request of an injunction does not violate the SEP holder’s obligations under EU competition law. There are different views within the EU on how the Huawei v ZTE decision should be applied. However, the European Commission has urged the courts to strictly scrutinize SEP holders’ compliance with their FRAND obligations before awarding an injunction.
Against this background, SEP holders complaining about standard implementers’ alleged ‘hold-out strategies’ have initiated litigations in an increasingly large and diverse number of countries. Just recently, Hisense was reported to have entered into a worldwide licensing agreement to a video coding patent pool[18] including SEPs of over 46[19] licensors, only hours after a Brazilian court issued an inunction against Hisense in response to a complaint by pool members JVC Kenwood and NEC Corporation.[20] This is just the most recent example of SEP holders being rewarded for broadening the geographical scope of their enforcement strategy.
Morocco as the Latest Entrant to the Global SEP Litigation Panorama
From the perspective of globally operating SEP licensors, it is thus only logical that SEP litigation has also now reached Morocco. Morocco is a significant market for Transsion, and its geographical position, close to Europe, makes it an attractive target for a European SEP holder like Ericsson. Since 2015, owners of European patents have also had convenient access to patent protection in Morocco, as European patent applications may be validated in Morocco. A granted European patent validated in Morocco has the same effects as a national patent (Article 50.1 of Law No. 17–97). In the region, a similar procedure only exists in Tunisia, thus contributing to Morocco’s attractiveness for European patent owners’ enforcement activities.
Nevertheless, for Moroccan courts, this case presents a significant challenge, as the country’s courts lack experience specifically with SEP licensing proceedings. Morocco’s patent regime is governed by Law No. 17‑97 on the Protection of Industrial Property, as amended, with exclusive jurisdiction vested in the commercial courts over disputes arising under the law. Venue generally lies at the defendant’s real or elected domicile, the place where its agent is established, or, for foreign‑domiciled defendants, the court where the industrial property office (OMPIC) is located (Articles 15, 204).
Patentees’ core rights and what constitutes infringement are broadly aligned with international norms. The owner enjoys an exclusive right to exploit the invention, defined by the claims and extending to products obtained directly by a patented process (Articles 51–52). Absent consent, prohibited acts include making, offering, marketing, using, importing, or stocking the patented product; using or offering a patented process; and dealing in products obtained directly by such a process (Article 53). Contributory infringement is captured by supplying means relating to an essential element of the invention with knowledge (or where it is obvious in the circumstances) that they are suited and intended for implementing the invention (Article 54). Moroccan patent law provides broad, general limitations and defenses (e.g., private/non-commercial use, experimental use, pharmacy preparations, domestic exhaustion, temporary presence of foreign conveyances, and prior user rights). However, it does not include SEP-specific or FRAND-based provisions. As Morocco has no established SEP case law, parties are likely to rely on general civil/competition law principles, as well as comparative arguments from other jurisdictions, when framing FRAND, conduct-based defenses, and proportionality against injunctive relief.
Procedurally, right holders can move quickly. On a showing that the merits appear well‑founded and if the infringement action is brought within 30 days of becoming aware of the facts, the court president may provisionally prohibit continuation of the alleged infringing acts or condition continuation on guarantees; the order itself may be conditioned on plaintiff‑posted security (Article 203). A powerful evidence‑preservation tool, the saisie‑description, allows a bailiff or registrar, with expert assistance, to conduct a detailed description with or without seizure of goods or processes and to investigate the origin, nature, and scope of the alleged infringement; the plaintiff must file on the merits within 30 days of execution, or the measures are void (Article 211). On the merits, courts may order confiscation of infringing articles and devices/means specifically intended for committing infringement, with the value credited when computing damages (Article 212).
Criminal exposure exists for knowing infringement, with penalties ranging from two to six months’ imprisonment and fines of MAD 50,000 to 500,000, increasing to six months to two years’ imprisonment when the infringer is an employee misusing knowledge from the patentee’s establishment (Articles 213–215). Criminal prosecution typically follows a complaint by the aggrieved party; criminal courts defer to civil adjudication on the reality of damages, and both civil and criminal actions are time‑barred three years after the infringing acts (Article 205).
Finally, Moroccan proceedings are conducted in Arabic, and patents validated in Morocco (including those originating from European filings) are enforceable if properly recorded. In an SEP case, parties should expect Moroccan courts to focus on national patent coverage, validity, and infringement, while treating FRAND issues through general law rather than a codified SEP framework. Early attention to provisional measures, evidence preservation, and timeliness requirements is critical to both enforcement and defense strategies in this forum.
In Morocco, SEP caselaw could develop along three pathways, each with different implications for injunctive relief and FRAND positioning:
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- Patent law/public-interest approach: Moroccan industrial property law includes compulsory and ex officio licensing, but it frames them as deliberately narrow, exceptional safety valves rather than general limits on injunctions. The classic compulsory-license route for non-working or inadequate supply by the patentee (Articles 60 to 65) will often not fit within an SEP dispute, because the practical problem typically lies in the implementer’s commercial use without a license, not the patentee’s failure to “work” the invention locally; the dependent-patent mechanism (Article 66) likewise rarely maps cleanly onto SEPs. The more plausible relevance in an SEP context might lie in the ex officio licensing regime (Articles 67 to 75), which authorizes administrative intervention on defined public-interest grounds; even though it remains fact-intensive and rarely triggered, it might support an argument that Moroccan law recognizes public-interest constraints where remedies would disrupt access to widely used products, for instance, if an injunction would effectively exclude a market-leading, low-priced handset supplier and materially increase consumer prices. As a comparative illustration, the Obama administration vetoed an ITC exclusion order that would have barred imports of certain older iPhone and iPad models after a 60-day review of an ITC determination based on Samsung’s assertion of an SEP,[21] reflecting how public-interest considerations can constrain injunctive-style relief even if there might be infringement.
- Competition-law/abuse-of-dominance approach: Article 36 of the Moroccan Constitution prohibits and sanctions the abuse of a dominant position and monopoly, offering a credible competition-law anchor for a EU Huawei v. ZTE–type framework by analogy: an SEP holder’s pursuit of injunctive relief could qualify as abusive where the implementer follows a timely, good-faith path toward a FRAND license. This aligns with the EU approach, where FRAND injunction doctrine has primarily been developed under Article 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) and the guidance from the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) in Huawei v. ZTE[22], rather than through SEP-specific statutes. By contrast, U.S. antitrust under the Sherman Act §2 focuses on monopolization and exclusionary conduct and does not operate as a general “abuse of dominance” regime; therefore, U.S. FRAND disputes more often turn on contract and equitable doctrines. While Morocco currently lacks an established body of SEP/FRAND case law, the textual and functional proximity between Article 36 and Article 102 of the TFEU make it plausible that Moroccan courts could derive a similar analytical framework as the one in Huawei v. ZTE. However, early cases may involve substantial interpretive discretion and disagreement over the precise contours of compliant conduct.
- Contractual approach: A Moroccan court could also treat FRAND as primarily a contractual dispute (SSO undertaking, negotiation conduct, and remedies), and – subject to private international law rules on jurisdiction and applicable law – assess whether either side breached good-faith bargaining obligations and what remedy follows. This route can sidestep difficult market-definition questions, but it places heavier weight on documentary evidence of offers, counteroffers, and negotiation timelines.
Across all three tracks, the practical takeaway remains: So far, Morocco does not have a dedicated SEP framework; therefore, parties must anchor FRAND conduct and proportionality arguments within Morocco’s existing general legal framework. In practice, the second pathway (competition-law/abuse-of-dominance approach) is the most likely pathway for a court-led FRAND framework, given the close functional analogy between Morocco’s Article 36 and Article 102 of the TFEU and the CJEU framework based on Huawei v. ZTE. The first pathway (patent-law public-interest mechanisms) will likely play a minor role, as compulsory and ex officio licensing provisions are narrow, exceptional, and fact-specific, with their statutory triggers typically not mapping cleanly onto SEP disputes. The third pathway (contractual approach) remains possible but challenging, as it would require Moroccan courts to navigate several contractual questions related to FRAND undertakings and global SEP portfolio licensing. Against that backdrop, early Moroccan SEP disputes will likely turn on competition-law narratives.
SWOT analysis of Moroccan court proceedings
Strengths: Morocco offers a robust statutory toolkit for patent enforcement under Law No. 17‑97, including swift provisional measures (court‑ordered injunctions subject to security) and “saisie”‑description for evidence preservation. These proceedings offer the prospect of significant remedies, such as the confiscation of infringing goods and tools, as well as criminal penalties for knowing infringement, which can enhance settlement leverage. European patent validation in Morocco facilitates the straightforward enforcement of EPO-originating telecom patents if properly recorded.
Weaknesses: There is currently no established SEP/FRAND case law in Morocco. FRAND and competition‑law arguments must be framed under general civil law and antitrust principles. Limited historical patent litigation in Morocco may also translate into capacity and experience constraints for complex, multi-jurisdictional SEP disputes.
Opportunities: The case presents an opportunity to position Morocco as a credible venue for resolving sophisticated IP disputes, attracting global clients, and fostering local-to-international co-counsel collaboration. This may further enable the country to develop judicial expertise in high-tech IP cases and bolster the country’s strategy to enhance the protection of industrial property, thereby attracting investments in the country’s high-tech sector.
Threats: There is also a risk that Moroccan courts may become entangled in protracted disputes involving complex legal arguments for which there is no immediate precedent or statutory basis in Moroccan law. From the perspective of Moroccan consumers, another risk is that the court may order significant prohibitive measures against Transsion, which may result in insufficient leverage to secure a global settlement, but deprive Moroccan consumers of access to lower-cost phones (which currently account for over 50% of the Moroccan smartphone market).
For the parties, navigating these complex opportunities and challenges requires experience in SEP licensing and litigation, as well as an understanding of the specificities of the Moroccan court system. Effective case strategy hinges on mastering urgent measures (injunctions, saisie‑description, security requirements), venue and timing rules, and evidentiary practice under Law No. 17‑97. SEP‑specific licensing experience is essential to present or rebut contractual and antitrust‑based defenses, calibrate proportionality of remedies, and integrate Moroccan proceedings into global settlement dynamics.
From a policy perspective, it is essential to recognize the broader implications of this commercial dispute, articulate the relevant public policy objectives, and develop a Moroccan policy stance on SEP licensing issues.
About Us
BRELA Research in Economics and Legal Analytics (BRELA) is a research and consulting company based in Rabat, Morocco. BRELA specializes in empirical analysis at the intersection of technology standards, intellectual property, regulation, and innovation, with a particular focus on standard-essential patents (SEPs) and licensing on fair, reasonable, and non-discriminatory (FRAND) terms. Our core activity combines data-driven research on standards development and SEP licensing with advice on standardization strategy, patent policy, and FRAND licensing, including expert testimony and tailored analyses for multinational corporations, law firms, and other stakeholders.[23]
KORTE LAW is a Morocco-based international boutique focused on cross-border business law and foreign investment. The firm advises on corporate structuring, commercial litigation and arbitration, with multilingual capability (Arabic, English, French, German) and offices in Rabat and Casablanca. Working in association with AMERELLER – an international firm with more than 80 lawyers and 11 offices across MENA and Europe – Korte Law offers seamless support on complex corporate, regulatory, and dispute matters.[24] [25]
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[1] Houldsworth. 2025. BREAKING: Ericsson sues Transsion in Morocco, Indonesia and Colombia. URL: https://www.iam-media.com/article/ericsson-sues-transsion-in-morocco-indonesia-and-colombia. Rafferty. 2025. BREAKING: First-ever major SEP infringement suit in Morocco: Ericsson ramps up 4G, 5G SEP enforcement campaign against Transsion in Indonesia, Colombia, Morocco. URL: https://ipfray.com/breaking-first-ever-major-sep-infringement-suit-in-morocco-ericsson-ramps-up-4g-5g-sep-enforcement-campaign-against-transsion-in-indonesia-colombia-morocco.
[2] Ericsson. 2025. Ericsson compelled to take legal action against Transsion. URL: https://www.ericsson.com/en/news/2025/11/ericsson-compelled-to-take-legal-action-against-transsion.
[3] Specifically, Ericsson filed additional lawsuits in the Judicial Delegature of the Superintendence of Industry and Commerce (SIC) of Colombia, Civil Circuit Courts of Bogota, the Commercial Court at the Central Jakarta District Court, and the Tribunal of Commerce of First instance in Casablanca. See: Rafferty. 2025. BREAKING: First-ever major SEP infringement suit in Morocco: Ericsson ramps up 4G, 5G SEP enforcement campaign against Transsion in Indonesia, Colombia, Morocco. URL: https://ipfray.com/breaking-first-ever-major-sep-infringement-suit-in-morocco-ericsson-ramps-up-4g-5g-sep-enforcement-campaign-against-transsion-in-indonesia-colombia-morocco/.
[4] “We invited Transsion to submit our differences to a neutral arbitral panel, rather than pursuing the various actions in court. […] Transsion did not accept our arbitration offer and instead continues to benefit from Ericsson’s patented technology without a license. […] [2] Transsion had thirty (30) days to consider and accept Ericsson’s offer to arbitrate. The offer was made to Transsion on November 14, 2025, and expired without Transsion accepting the offer.” See: Earle. 2025. Hold-out: the injustice of delaying justice. URL: https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/hold-out-injustice-delaying-justice-robert-earle-zrxee/?trackingId=3pXbJbXWTwyN5KCoA5Y1IQ%3D%3D.
[5] Müller. 2025. BREAKING: Qualcomm settles with China’s Transsion (Africa’s smartphone market leader): Indian patent lawsuit withdrawn. URL: https://ipfray.com/breaking-qualcomm-settles-with-chinas-transsion-africas-smartphone-market-leader-indian-patent-lawsuit-withdrawn/. Rafferty. 2025. BREAKING: Philips and Transsion settle Indian SEP dispute over AAC, USAC. URL: https://ipfray.com/breaking-philips-and-transsion-settle-indian-sep-dispute-over-aac-usac/.
[6] 36Kr European Central Station. 2025. The “atypical” path to going global: How does Transsion rewrite the rules with “localized innovation”? URL: https://eu.36kr.com/en/p/3300328226064645.
[7] Cruysberghs. 2025. Global smartphone market grows 7 percent in 2024, challenges expected in 2025. URL: https://itdaily.com/news/business/global-smartphone-market-growing-7-percent-in-2024/.
[8] Rafferty. 2025. BREAKING: First-ever major SEP infringement suit in Morocco: Ericsson ramps up 4G, 5G SEP enforcement campaign against Transsion in Indonesia, Colombia, Morocco. URL: https://ipfray.com/breaking-first-ever-major-sep-infringement-suit-in-morocco-ericsson-ramps-up-4g-5g-sep-enforcement-campaign-against-transsion-in-indonesia-colombia-morocco/.
[9] Ericsson. 2025. Ericsson compelled to take legal action against Transsion. URL: https://www.ericsson.com/en/news/2025/11/ericsson-compelled-to-take-legal-action-against-transsion.
[10] Baron et al. 2023. Empirical assessment of potential challenges in SEP licensing. URL: https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/02013971-e7cd-11ed-a05c-01aa75ed71a1/language-en.
[11] For the U.S., see: Lemley and Simcoe. 2018. How essential are standard-essential patents. URL: https://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/clr/vol104/iss3/2.
[12] A study for the European Commission found that in the year 2021, over 45% of global SEP litigations took place in China. See Baron et al., ‘Challenges in SEP Licensing’ supra note 11; page 98.
[13] The first court in the world to determine FRAND royalty rates for SEP licenses was the U.S. District Court of the Western District of Washington in April 2013 in Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., No. C10-1823JLR (W.D. Wash. 2013). URL: https://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/text/591387. The first determination of a global FRAND royalty rate was by the UK High Court in 2017 in Unwired Planet v. Huawei, [2017] EWHC 711 (Pat). URL: https://www.judiciary.uk/wp-content/uploads/2017/04/unwired-planet-v-huawei-20170405.pdf. In recent years, courts in the UK and China have determined global FRAND royalty rates for SEP Licenses in various worldwide SEP licensing disputes, including InterDigital v. Lenovo, Optis v. Apple, Nokia v. Oppo, and Huawei v. InterDigital.
[14] In the case of cellular communication, the relevant policy is usually the Intellectual Property Rights Policy of ETSI, an organization that is based in France, as most SEP licensing commitments related to 3GPP have been made under this policy. URL: https://www.etsi.org/images/files/IPR/etsi-ipr-policy.pdf.
[15] For an overview of the situation in Germany, see the following BRELA whitepaper:
Baron, Bergallo, Sergheraert. 2024. Empirical Analysis of the German Caselaw on SEP Injunctions after Huawei v ZTE. URL: https://brela-research.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/11/German-Caselaw-on-SEP.pdf.
[16] Sandys. 2022. Avanci increases licensing rate for 4G programme. URL: https://www.juve-patent.com/people-and-business/avanci-increases-licensing-rate-for-4g-automotive-programme/.
[17] In the case of cellular communication, the relevant policy is usually the Intellectual Property Rights Policy of ETSI, an organization that is based in France, as most SEP licensing commitments related to 3GPP have been made under this policy. URL: https://www.etsi.org/images/files/IPR/etsi-ipr-policy.pdf.
[18] Müller. 2025. BREAKING: Within hours of Brazilian injunction, Hisense takes HEVC Advance license settling disputes with multiple pool licensors. URL: https://ipfray.com/breaking-within-hours-of-brazilian-injunction-hisense-takes-hevc-advance-license-settling-disputes-with-multiple-pool-licensors/.
[19] Access Advance. HEVC Advance Patent Pool: HEVC List of Licensors. URL: https://accessadvance.com/hevc-advance-patent-pool-licensors/.
[20] Müller. 2025. BREAKING: Within hours of Brazilian injunction, Hisense takes HEVC Advance license settling disputes with multiple pool licensors. URL: https://ipfray.com/breaking-within-hours-of-brazilian-injunction-hisense-takes-hevc-advance-license-settling-disputes-with-multiple-pool-licensors/.
[21] Guglielmo. 2013. President Obama Vetoes ITC Ban On iPhone, iPads; Apple Happy, Samsung Not. URL: https://www.forbes.com/sites/connieguglielmo/2013/08/03/president-obama-vetoes-itc-ban-on-iphone-ipads-apple-happy-samsung-not/.
[22] Makris, Tapia. 2019. Confidentiality In FRAND Licensing After Huawei v ZTE: National Courts in Europe Searching For Balance. URL: https://lesi.org/article-of-the-month/confidentiality-in-frand-licensing-after-huawei-v-zte-national-courts-in-europe-searching-for-balance/.
[23] BRELA website: https://brela-research.com/.
[24] KORTE LAW website: https://korte-law.com/.
[25] AMERELLER website: https://amereller.com/.
